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THE VALIDITY OF THE DISCRIMINATORY CHARITABLE TRUST -- STATE ACTION AND THE

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
The charitable trust abounds in great numbers; it constitutes a favorite vehicle for philanthropic giving. The
wealth of philanthropy, in charitable trusts and related forms,
"can only be measured in the tens of billions of dollars."'
The charitable trust should, of course, be drafted to
effectuate the intentions of the settlor. If the settlor desires
to limit his bounty to a particular race, religion or nationality,
the draftsman is faced with an obvious problem. He must
determine whether or not it is possible to effectuate the
settlor's intentions without running afoul of the United
States Constitution.
The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution2 states that "No State shall ...

deny to any person

within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the Laws."
The purpose of this comment will be to examine the
validity of the discriminatory charitable trust and the restrictive scholarship in light of the above constitutional provision.
As will become evident, the application of this constitutional
limitation will depend upon the ascertainment of "state
action" as that concept has been defined and broadened
throughout the years. Finally, the effect of appointing private successor trustees in a discriminatory charitable trust
will be discussed.
Throughout this comment, it will be assumed that a
valid charitable trust has been created by the settlor. The
comment will be basically concerned with the uncertain future
of such trust in view of its discriminatory or restrictive
provisions.
THE WILL OF STEPHEN GMnAD

The trust which brought the issue of the validity of the
discriminatory charitable trust to the fore in this country
was the landmark trust dealing with alleged discrimination
1. Clark, Charitable Trusts, the Fourteenth Amendment and the Will of
Stephen Girard,66 YALE L.J. 979, 1010 (1955).
2. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
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at Girard College. By will probated in 1831, Stephen Girard
left a fund to the City of Philadelphia in trust for the
erection, maintenance and operation of a "college," providing
that it was to admit "as many poor white male orphans,
between the ages of six and ten years, as the said income
shall be adequate to maintain."
The will named as trustee the City of Philadelphia. From
1869 until 1954, by virtue of an act of the Pennsylvania legislature, the trust was administered and the college operated
by the "Board of Directors of City Trusts of the City of
Philadelphia." In 1954, two Negro boys by the names of
Foust and Felder, applied for admission to the college, but
were denied admission by the "Board" because they were
Negroes. They petitioned the Orphan's Court of Philadelphia
County for an order directing the "Board" to admit them,
alleging that their exclusion because of race violated the
fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution.
The court's rejection of this constitutional contention and
refusal to order the applicants' admission was affirmed by
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in In re Estate of Stephen
Girard.' The United States Supreme Court, however, reversed and remanded, stating:
The Board which operated Girard College is an
agency of the State of Pennsylvania. Therefore, even
though the Board was acting as trustee, its refusal
to admit Foust and Felder to the college because
they were Negroes was discrimination by the State.
Such discrimination is forbidden by the Fourteenth
Amendment.'
On remand, the Orphan's Court construed the Supreme
Court's opinion to mean no more than that the Board of
City Trusts was constitutionally incapable of administering
Girard College in accordance with the testamentary requirements of its founder. The Orphan's Court, therefore, removed the "Board" as trustee, and substituted thirteen private citizens, none of whom held any public office or otherwise
exercised any governmental power. On appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,' the question became one of whether
3. 386 Pa. 548, 127 A.2d 287 (1956).
4. Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors of City Trusts of the City of Philadelphia, 353 U.S. 230, 231 (1957).
S. In re Girard College Trusteeship, 391 Pa. 434, 138 Ai2d 844 (1958).
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or not the action taken by the Orphan's Court in appointing
private trustees was inconsistent with the directive of the
United States Supreme Court. In answering this question
in the negative, the court relied upon three basic propositions:
that a testamentary benefactor may impose certain limitations upon the use to be made of the trust property; that as
a matter of acceptable trust law a trustee may be removed
and replaced if he is incapable of complying with the terms
of the trust;' and that the opinion of the United States
Supreme Court contained no directive to admit Foust and
Felder to Girard College. The court stated:
[T]he Supreme Court did not say that there is any
Constitutional or other barrier to the removal of the
Board of City Trusts as trustee of Girard College in
order that the Orphanage can be administered in
accordance with all of the testator's express directions including the qualifications for admission to the
student body.7
In addition, the court mentioned that the Orphan's Court did
not act to exclude Negroes from the College. None had ever
been admitted. What the Orphan's Court did was to refuse
to admit the Negro applicants because they did not qualify
for admission under the terms of Girard's will. The United
States Supreme Court denied certiorari.8
The denial of certiorari by the United States Supreme
Court laid to rest the Girard College trust versus the fourteenth amendment for a period of time. However, the cause
for Negro applicants was not to be denied. In two companion
federal court cases,' the State of Pennsylvania, the Attorney
General, and seven Negro applicants took a different approach to their problem. They sought to apply to the trust
the Pennsylvania Public Accommodations Act,"0 which prohibited racial discrimination in places of public accommodation, resort or amusement. All educational institutions are
6. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRuSTS, § 387 (1957), which states: "A
court may remove a trustee of a charitable trust if his continuing to act
as trustee would be detrimental to the accomplishment of the purposes of
the trust."
7. In re Girard College Trusteeship, supra note 5, at 847.
8. Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors of City Trustees of Philadelphia, 357
U.S. 570 (1958).
9. Commonwealth v. Brown, 260 F. Supp. 323 (E. D. Pa. 1966); Commonwealth
V. Brown, 260 F. Supp. 358 (E. D. Pa. 1966).
10. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4654 (1963).
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covered if they are "under the supervision of this Common-

wealth. '"" The Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, in finding the Act applicable, reasoned
as follows:
1. Girard College is an educational institution under
the supervision of this Commonwealth; therefore, the Public
Accommodations Act is applicable;
2. The Act prohibits defendants from refusing plaintiffs
admission to Girard College on the ground that they are not
white, if they are otherwise qualified;
3. Plaintiffs are entitled to a permanent and final
injunction, enjoining defendants from excluding them from
Girard College solely on the basis of their race.
However, the Negro applicants' success was short lived.
One year later, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held
that previous state court proceedings 2 which had held the
Pennsylvania Public Accommodations Act inapplicable to
Girard College were binding upon the federal courts. 8 Accordingly, the federal district court was precluded from
construing the statute as barring continued denial of admission to Negroes.
The fire of hope for the Negro applicants was re-kindled
with the rendition of the United States Supreme Court's
opinion in Evans v. Newton." Since they had been denied
relief under the Pennsylvania Public Accommodations Act,"5
they looked to Evans as a mandate for a renewed argument
based on the fourteenth amendment. In Evans, the testator
devised to the Mayor and City Council of Macon, Georgia,
a tract of land to be used as a park and pleasure ground for
"white people only." The will provided that the park should
be under the control of a Board of Managers of seven persons, all of whom were to be white. The city kept the park
segregated for some years, but in time let Negroes use it,
taking the position that the park was a public facility which
11. Id. §§ (c).
12. Girard's Estate, 4 Pa. D. & C. 2d 671, 702-03 (1955) ; Girard's Estate, 4 Pa.
D. & C. 2d 708, 721 (1956); in re Estate of Stephen Girard, supra note 3;
In re Girard College Trusteeship, supra note 5.
13. Commonwealth v. Brown, 373 F.2d 771 (3d Cir. 1967).
14. 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
15. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4654 (1963).
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it could not constitutionally manage and maintain on a segregated basis. The Board of Managers of the park sought to
have the City removed as trustee. Negro interveners asked
that the court refuse to appoint private trustees. The lower
court accepted the resignation of the City as trustee and
appointed three individual trustees. The Supreme Court of
Georgia affirmed.' In reversing, the United States Supreme
Court seemed to take the position that "once a public facility,
always a public facility." 7 The Court stated: "Conduct that
is formally 'private' may become so entwined with governmental policies or so impregnated with a governmental character as to become subject to the constitutional limitations placed
upon state action."' The Court in Evans applied a type of
"momentum concept" and considered the public character
of the discriminating enterprise. It reasoned that the momentum that the park had acquired as a public facility could
not be dissipated merely by the appointment of private
trustees: "Where the tradition of municipal control had
become firmly established, we cannot take judicial notice
that the mere substitution of private trustees instantly transferred this park from the public to the private sector.' '"
Although the Evans decision must be restricted to a
reversal of the state court's appointment of private trustees,
a reasonable implication from the holding is that if the
discriminating facility is public in nature it is subject to
the mandate of the fourteenth amendment even in the hands
of private successor trustees.2"
Considering this decision as a mandate in their favor,
the Negro applicants to Girard College once again returned
to the federal district court. This court, in Commonwealth v.
Brown,2 after finding Evans controlling, held that the fourteenth amendment prohibited Girard College from refusing
admission to qualified Negro male orphans solely because
Evans v. Newton, 220 Ga. 280, 138 S.E.2d 573 (1964).
Evans v. Newton, supra note 14.
Id. at 299.
Evans v. Newton, supra note 14, at 301.
Since, as a general rule, the corpus of a charitable trust reverts to the heirs
and next of kin of the settlor upon the failure of the charitable purpose,
the heirs and next of kin of Evans are in a position (in the absence of the
application of the doctrine of cy pres) to insist that the trust property
revert to them in the form of a resulting trust. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS § 413 (1956).
21. 270 F. Supp. 782 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
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of their color, even though non-public trustees had been substituted for public trustees since Pennsylvania had not purged
itself of the discriminatory connection. In so holding the
court stated:
Recognizing the unavailability of an "infallible
test," we nevertheless find it logically and legally
impossible to escape the conclusion that racial exclusion at Girard College is so afflicted with State
action, in its widened concept, that it cannot constitutionally endure. Since the strictures of the Fourteenth Amendment apply to the administration of
the institution, it may no longer deny admission' 2 to
applicants simply because they are not "white.'

Brown has very recently been affirmed on appeal to the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals.2 3 This court affirmed the District
Court basically upon the authority of Evans. However, both
the majority and concurring opinions stated, by way of
dictum, that the District Court could also be affirmed on
the basis of Shelley v. Kraemer.24 Therefore, as a consequence
of Evans and Brown, the private trustees of Girard College
must now admit the Negro applicants.
THE RESTRICTED ScHoTAIsHrP AND STATE ACTION
UNDER THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

The previous discussion of Girard College and the discriminatory charitable trust will definitely have an effect
in other areas. The presence of Evans and Brown will be
felt in similar, but differing, fact situations. For example,
in a majority of states, the state universities and their boards
of regents are subject to virtually absolute control by the
state legislatures, though in practice the extent and degree
of such control varies widely among the states. If, as appears
to be true in most states, the state universities and their
boards of regents are controlled by the state legislatures,
his control would seem to bring the state action doctrine into
22. Id. at 792.
23. Commonwealth v. Brown, 36 U.S.L.W. 2570 (3d Cir. Mar. 19, 1968), cert.
denied, 36 U.S.L.W. 3439 (U.S. May 21, 1968).
24. 334 U.S. 1 (1948). See text accompanying note 33 infra. See also Hackett
v. Hackett, 150 N.E.2d 431 (Ohio App. 1958), where the Ohio Supreme Court
refused to enforce a separation agreement under which the parties had agreed
that the children would be reared in a certain religious faith. The court
held that to do so would be state action, and violative of the religious liberty
provided for in the first amendment.
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full swing, preventing the state or its agent from restricting
the use of scholarship funds on the basis of race, religion, or
nationality, for the legislature of a state cannot permit any
agency within its control to discriminate on an unreasonable
basis.
It would seem obvious that if a state university used
public funds for a restricted scholarship, this violates the
fourteenth amendment. It has been argued that a different
question is raised if private funds are donated to a state
university to provide for a scholarship which is restricted on
the basis of race, religion or nationality. This did not appear,
however, to give the Girard court or the Evans court any
particular difficulty. It was immaterial that the discrinnatory practice was privately created, so long as the state or
its agency performed the discriminatory act.
The crucial factor, then, is in determining what constitutes "state action" within the fourteenth amendment.
It must be remembered at the outset that private discrimination is not forbidden by the fourteenth amendment."
Thus, in the Civil Rights Cases," the United States Supreme
Court, in holding the Civil Rights Act of 187527 unconstitutional as it applied to compelling privately owned and
operated facilities to be made available without racial discrimination, stated: "It is state action of a particular character that is prohibited. Individual invasion of individual rights
is not the subject matter of the Amendment." 2 8
The traditional definition of "state action" is that set
forth in Ex parte Virginia: "Whenever one acts in the
name and for the state, and is clothed with the State's power,
his act is that of the State."2
However, since 1879 the
concept of "state action" has been developed and broadened
to a very great extent.
Two leading cases dealing with "state action" under
0 and Terry
the fourteenth amendment are Marsh v. Alabama"
25. This comment makes no attempt to deal with the possible application of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.
26. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
27. Act of March 1, 1875, 18 Stat. 335 (1875).
28. Civil Rights Cases, supra note 24, at 11.
29. Ez parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 347 (1879).
30. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
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v. Adams."1 Marsh involved a company owned town. The
town and its shopping district were accessible to and freely
used by the public in general and there was nothing to distinguish them from any other town and shopping center
except for the fact that the title to the property belonged
to a private corporation. Defendant, a Jehovah's Witness,
who distributed religious literature on the sidewalks of the
town, was charged under a state statute which made it a
crime to enter or remain on the premises of another after
having been warned not to do so. Defendant contended that
her freedom of religion had been abridged. The Supreme
Court of the United States held that even though this town
was privately owned, it had the same facilities and performed the same functions as a municipal corporation. Therefore, the town must afford the citizens the protection of the
first and fourteenth amendments. In finding sufficient
"state action," the Court seemed to prophesy the reasoning
of Evans, decided 23 years later, i.e., if the discriminating
facility is public in nature and performs public functions, it
is subject to the commands of the first and fourteenth
amendments.
In Terry, plaintiffs, qualified Negro voters of a Texas
County, sued to determine the legality of their being excluded,
solely because of their race, from voting in elections held by
the Jaybird Primary, an association consisting of all qualified
voters in the County. The association held an election in each
election year to select candidates for county offices to run
for nomination in the official county offices to run for
nomination in the official Democratic primary. The association's elections were not governed by state laws and did not
utilize state elective machinery or funds. The defendants
contended that the fifteenth amendment applied only to
elections or primaries held under state regulation, that their
association was not regulated by the state at all, and that it
was not a political party but a self-governing voluntary club.
The court again looked to the public character of the discriminating enterprise in finding the requisite "state action."
The Court stated:
For a state to permit such a duplication of its election processes is to permit a flagrant abuse of those
31. 345 U.S. 461 (1958).
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processes to defeat the purposes of the fifteenth
It is immaterial that the state
amendment ....
does not control that part of the elective process
which it leaves for the Jaybirds to manage. The
Jaybird Primary has become an integral part... of
the elective process that determines who shall rule
and govern in the County. The effect of the whole
procedure . . . is to do precisely that which the
Fifteenth Amendment forbids .... "
From both Marsh and Terry, it seems safe to conclude
that when a private person or group performs a function
which is essentially public in nature and normally performed
by the government, the private activity is subject to the same
constitutional requirements as it would be if it were in fact
carried on by a governmental agency.
8 3 found sufThe landmark case of Shelley v. Kraemer,
ficient "state action" in another context. In Shelley, certain
property was subject to a restrictive covenant whereby the
land was not to be sold to members of the Negro race. Defendants were Negroes who bought a parcel of the land. Plaintiffs were owners of other property subject to the terms of
the restrictive covenant, and they sought to enjoin defendants
from taking possession of the property. The Supreme Court
of Missouri granted the relief requested." In reversing, the
United States Supreme Court held that the state court's
enforcement of the racially restrictive covenant constituted
sufficient "state action" to bring the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment into play. The Court stated:

That the action of the state courts and judicial
officers in their official capacities is to be regarded
as action of the State within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment, is a proposition which has long
been established by decisions of this court."5
For the purpose of convenience, state court enforcement of
a racially restrictive provision will be referred to as "Shelleytype state action" throughout the remainder of this comment.
6 the
In the companion case of Barrows v. Jackson,"
court was again faced with a racially restrictive covenant.
32.
33.
34.
36.
86.

Terry v. Adams, supra note 31, at 469-70.
Shelley v. Kraemer, supra note 24.
Kraemer v. Shelley, 355 Mo. 814, 198 S.W.2d 679 (1946).
Shelley v. Kraemer, supra note 24, at 14.
346 U.S. 249 (1953).
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In Barrows, the court was asked to award plaintiff damages
for defendant's alleged breach of the restrictive covenant by
selling the land to a Negro. Barrows differs from Shelley in
that in the latter the trial court enforced the restrictive
covenant. Here, one covenantor was suing a co-covenantor
for damages. Unlike Shelley, there was no Negro before the
court in Barrows. Nevertheless, the court had no problem in
finding the requisite "state action." The Court stated: "The
action of a state court at law to sanction the validity of the
restrictive covenant here involved would constitute state
action as surely as it was state action to enforce such covenants in equity, as in Shelley .... ,,'7 The Court would have
been inconsistent with Shelley if it had awarded damages
for the breach of a restrictive covenant which it had previously held unenforceable by way of an injunction.
If "state action" is in fact the only prerequisite for the
application of the constitutional limitation, then it is clear
that "Shelley-type state action" was present in both the first
Girard College case"8 and in Evans." In the first Girard
College case, there was clearly state action as a result of the
Orphan Court's appointment of private successor trustees.
The only purpose of such appointment was to carry forward
the racially restrictive provisions of Girard's will. Yet, for
what it may be worth, the United States Supreme Court
denied certiorari. In Evans, the court did not even mention
Shelley, even though Shelley would seem directly applicable,
since the state court enforced the racial restriction by appointing private successor trustees. Further, although the court
in Commonwealth v. Brown" mentioned Shelley by way of
dictum, the case was clearly decided on other grounds. Although this treatment may seem inconsistent, in both Brown
and Evans, the court was able to take another route in finding
sufficient state action, i.e., by looking to the public character
of the discriminating enterprise. Consequently, it was not
necessary that it rely on either Shelley or Barrows.
Therefore, one of three rationales may be deduced with
respect to Shelley: It must be limited to its facts; the concept of "state action" does not provide the complete answer
31.
38.
39.
40.

Id. at 254.
In re Girard College Trusteeship, supra note 5.
Evans v. Newton, aupra note 14.
Commonwealth v. Brown, supra note 23.
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with respect to the application of the fourteenth amendment
to the restrictive or discriminatory charitable trust; or the
Court is avoiding the far-reaching consequences of applying
the Shelley holding to the typical private discriminatory or
restrictive charitable trust.
It may be wise to note, however, that a "perfect case"
for the application of Shelley has not yet been presented to
the Supreme Court of the United States, i.e., the state court
enforcement of a privately created and administered discriminatory charitable trust, such discriminating facility
being purely private in nature rather than public. One can
only hypothesize as to the outcome of such a case.
Even in the "perfect case" there are factors in addition
to "Shelley-type state action" which may aid a court in finding "state action" if the charitable trust happens to contain
discriminatory provisions. These factors include certain benefits afforded to the charitable trust, both by state statute
and by state case law."'
The most recent word on the concept of "state action"
has been spoken in Reitman v. Mulkey," where the Court
stated that there was no infallible test for determining the
bounds of "state action" under the fourteenth amendment,
and that each case must be decided according to the facts
and circumstances presented therein.
CONCLUSION
At present, the discriminatory charitable trust or the
restricted scholarship will only be invalidated if the following
conditions exist:
41. The charitable trust is normally enforced at the suit of the state attorney
general. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 391 (1957). The charitable
trust property is generally immune from tort liability. 4 SCOTT, TRUSTS
§ 402.2 (2d ed. 1956). The charitable trust is exempt from the provisions
of the Rule against Perpetuities. 10 AM. JUR. 2D Charities § 17 (1964).
See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 365 (1957). The charitable
donor and the charitable corporation are accorded substantial benefits
under the federal income tax laws. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 170 and 501.
Cf. Rev. Rul. 67-325, where the Commissioner denied the charitable deduction under § 170 and the exemption under § 501 where the contributions
were to be used to provide recreational facilities without charge to white
residents only. Since many charitable trusts are created primarily for tax
reasons, this Ruling raises the advisability of creating a charitable trust
which contains discriminatory or restrictive provisions.
42. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
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1. If the discriminating facility is public in nature and
performs functions comparable to those performed by the
government ;',
2. If the state or a state agency administers the discriminatory or restrictive provisions ;44 or
3. If private trustees succeed the public trustees after
the trust has taken on a public character."
Therefore, unless the Supreme Court decides to apply
Shelley to privately created and administered discrimination,
it would seem that the charitable trust could discriminate at
will so long as it is administered by private trustees and is
not of such a public character as to draw into application
the Marsh and Terry cases. This would constitute private
discrimination which is clearly not within the purview of the
fourteenth amendment.
However, it must be concluded that the discriminatory
charitable trust and the restrictive scholarship are on very
tenuous ground. Those who are most concerned with the
creation and administration of charitable trusts and restrictive scholarships must be aware of the acute problems that
could arise if the validity of such a trust was attacked in a
court of law because of certain discriminatory provisions
contained therein. From a planning and drafting standpoint,
the practitioner cannot ignore the fourteenth amendment and
the broad and far-reaching implications of the decisions construing that amendment.
Finally, if a presently existing charitable trust is contested in a court of law and found by the court to contain
discriminatory or restrictive provisions which violate the
fourteenth amendment, the court may apply the doctrine of
cy pres to the trust corpus. In order to apply this doctrine,
the court may be able to conclude that the settlor possessed
a general charitable intent in the event that it became impossible, impracticable or illegal to carry out the particular
43. Marsh v. Alabama, eupra note 30; Terry v. Adams, supra note 31; Evans
v. Newton, supra note 14.
44. Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors of City Trusts of the City of Philadelphia, supra note 4.
45. Commonwealth v. Brown, supra note 21; Evans v. Newton, supra note 14.
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charitable purpose." If the court is able to so conclude, then

it will direct the application of the trust property to a similar
charitable purpose that falls within this general charitable
intent. As a result of this application of the property, a
reversion to the heirs or next of kin of the settlor is

prevented.47
CHAFMES R. HALLAM

46. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399 (1957):
If property is given in trust to be applied to a particular charitable
purpose, and it is or becomes impossible or impracticable or illegal to
carry out the particular purpose, and if the settlor manifested a more
general charitable intention to devote the property to charitable purposes, the trust will not fail but the court will direct the application
of the property to some charitable purpose which falls within the
general charitable intention of the settlor.
See also 4 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 399.2 (2d ed. 1956).
47. For cases applying the doctrine of cy pres in order to prevent a failure
of the trust and a reversion of the trust corpus, see In re Hawley, 223
N.Y.S.2d 803 (1961); Lafond v. City of Detroit, 357 Mich. 362, 98 N.W.2d
630 (1959); Howard Savings Inst. v. Peep, 34 N.J. 494, 170 A.2d 39 (1961);
Smith v. Moore, 225 F. Supp. 434 (E.D. Va. 1963), affd with slight mtodification, 343 F.2d 594 (4th Cir. 1965).
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